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Language Rights as Collective Rights:
Some Conceptual Considerations on Language Rights
Manuel Toscano Méndez1
AbstrAct
Stephen May holds that language rights have been insufficiently recog-
nized, or just rejected as problematic, in human rights theory and practice. 
Defending the “human rights approach to language rights”, he claims that 
language rights should be accorded the status of fundamental human rights, 
recognized as such by states and international organizations. This article ar-
gues that the notion of language rights is far from clear. According to May, 
one key reason for rejecting the claim that language rights should be consid-
ered human rights is the widespread belief that language rights are collec-
tive rights. In order to address this kind of objection, the collective character 
attributed to language rights must be carefully assessed, distinguishing two 
different views of what a collective right is.
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In a recent article, Stephen May calls attention to the plight of language 
rights in the theory and the practice of human rights. Well-known as advocate 
of linguistic rights, he claims that these rights have been the “Cinderella” of 
human rights in the post-World War II age. According to his words, language 
rights are:
A ‘bastard stepchild’ in the wider family of human rights, roundly 
rejected as problematic and/or regularly ignored at worst, reluc-
tantly acknowledged and desultory implemented at best. Even now, 
60 years from the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of 
1 University of Málaga. E-mail: mtoscano@uma.es. This article is part of the project The 
Civic Constellation (Spanish National Research Plan, FFI2011-23388).
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Human Rights (UDHR), the notion that language rights might be 
accorded the status of a fundamental human right, and recognized 
as such by nation states and supranational organizations, remains 
both highly contentious and widely contested (May 2011, 265, my 
emphasis).
May’s standpoint is worthy of consideration as a fine example of the 
human rights approach to language rights and his article raises important 
questions about this kind of rights. First, what is the place of rights concern-
ing language use in international human rights law, or how they fit into this 
developing legal framework. And second, why (and how) should these rights 
be recognized by both states and international organizations concerned with 
the protection and monitoring of human rights. This second issue amounts to 
ask for the normative arguments supporting the legal recognition of language 
rights as human rights.
Proponents of the human rights approach to language rights often conflate 
both issues, and it is not always easy to discern when they are speaking about 
lex lata, namely about the law as it exists, or when de lege ferenda, the law as 
it should be. This point is particularly important because it is difficult some-
times to know if they are talking about language rights as legal or as moral 
rights. However, both kinds of rights have different conditions of existence 
and conflating them does not favour a clear understanding of the matter under 
consideration.
May is more careful than usual and his arguments draw on debates in 
the interdisciplinary areas of political theory and international law (Dunbar 
2001). Given my lack of expertise in international law, this article will focus 
on the side of political theory. I agree with May that it is striking the lack of 
sustained argument and theoretical interest in political philosophy about the 
issue of language rights and linguistic justice in general, at least until recently 
(for exceptions, see Kymlicka & Patten 2003; Van Parijs 2011). Indeed, my 
main concern here is not properly discussing normative arguments, but deal-
ing with some conceptual issues involved.
A preliminary but important remark is needed, namely whether language 
rights are fundamental rights is a question to be answered by moral arguments 
(or arguments of political morality), and not just looking at the law. More 
precisely, following Leslie Green in a seminal article on language rights, I 
will assume hereinafter that “a legal right is a fundamental right if and only if 
it is at least partially justified by the fact that it protects a moral right” (Green 
1987, 647).
Obviously, legal rights can be justified by a large variety of reasons, not 
all of them counting as moral reasons or that special kind of moral consider-
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ations which are moral rights. But this sets an important condition for the dis-
cussion of language rights as human rights: we have to look for moral rights 
justifying, at least partially or in combination with other assumptions, the rec-
ognition and protection of language rights by international human rights law.
considering LAnguAge rights
As advocates of human rights approach to language rights usually do, 
May takes for granted that language rights are “a fundamental human right”. 
And they have coined the formula “linguistic human rights” to that effect 
(Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1995). There is much to say about the rhe-
torical effects –and political aims– to be achieved thereby. Of course, this 
approach seeks to attribute to language rights the aura of exceptional standing 
and urgency typically associated with human rights. As a result, what needs 
to be explained is why a basic human right has been neglected or weakly pro-
tected by national legal systems and international human rights instruments. 
So, the burden of proof is shifted towards the opponents of the just recogni-
tion of a fundamental moral human right.
However, it is far from clear what is meant by defining language rights 
as human rights.2 In the first place, the concept of language rights itself has 
proved elusive and there is no agreement about its meaning and scope. At 
best, the notion is “at a relatively primitive stage of development” (Mälksoo 
2000) and its precise content should be analyzed carefully. In this respect, 
Hohfeld’s analytical tools (claims, privileges, powers and immunities) can 
be helpful to come to grips with the concept of language rights, regardless of 
taking them as legal or moral rights.
One evident thing is the multifarious kinds of rights, or normative advan-
tages, covered under the label “languages rights”. For that reason, talking of 
language rights as “a fundamental human right” is unfortunate, because it 
looks like a single unqualified right to use a language. Take two well-known 
examples. For instance, in criminal cases defendants have a right to be in-
formed of the charges in a language they can understand (not necessarily their 
mother tongue), or the right to an interpreter paid by the state for translat-
ing criminal court proceedings and documents. In this case, we are speaking 
about the implications concerning language of a well-established fundamental 
right, the right to a fair trial. By contrast, enthusiastic advocates of human 
rights approach to language rights, like Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 
2 In passing, it should be reminded that the very idea of human rights is fraught with dif-
ficulties and misunderstandings. As Joseph Raz remarked, “there is not enough discipline under-
pinning the use of the term ‘human rights’ to make it a useful analytical tool” (2007, 19). Yet they 
are currently regarded as an overriding moral concern.
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have championed over the years the right to ‘mother tongue medium educa-
tion’; namely, the right of linguistic minorities not just to have their languages 
taught in school, but used as vehicular medium for instruction in primary and 
secondary schools.
In these two examples, we have a right stricto sensu or a claim-right in Ho-
hfeld’s terminology (1919), because the right of A to p is equivalent to B being 
under a duty to provide or to do p for A. In other words, if A has a claim against 
B that p, then B is under a duty towards A that B discharges if and only if p.
However, other significant language rights can be better understood as privi-
leges or liberties. In that case, if A has a right to p, that means that A has no duty 
towards B (or towards anybody) to refrain from p. In Hohfeld’s terms, A’s privi-
lege to p is just the fact that A is not under a duty not to p, but it does not imply 
that B (or anybody) has any duties to provide or facilitate p to A. Put simply, a 
privilege is the absence of a claim with the opposite content. For that reason we 
need to distinguish “naked liberties” from “protected liberties”. In the second 
case, we find a liberty in conjunction with a claim or claims operating like a sort 
of protective perimeter, according to the suggestion of H. L. A. Hart.
Take the case of freedom of speech. Being an important element of the 
classic civil and political liberties, well entrenched in national constitutions 
and international law, it is a crucial right regarding language use. Freedom of 
speech, as usually understood, covers both the content of communicative acts 
and the medium of expression, so it protects not only the views or opinions 
expressed but the choice of the language in which they are expressed too 
(Green 1991). Asserting A’s right to free speech means two things: 1) that A is 
at liberty to speak (or no to speak), not being under a duty no to speak; and 2) 
A has a claim towards other agents, namely that these agents do not interfere 
with A’s liberty to speak as she likes. Or, in what concerns us here, A is at 
liberty to choose the language for speaking and A has a claim against others 
protecting this choice from unwelcome interferences.
Nevertheless, we can consider claims as the central case without loss, be-
cause A’s liberty to do p is equivalent to the fact that A is not subject to a claim 
for not doing p. And a power is the normative capacity for creating, altering or 
waiving claims and liberties. 
But we can make the same point in a non-Hohfeldian conception of rights. 
Take for example the well-known definition of rights provided by Joseph Raz 
in The Morality of Freedom:
‘A has a right’ if and only if A can have rights, and, other things 
being equal, an aspect of A’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient 
reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty (Raz 
1986, 166).
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Two points are noteworthy in Raz’s definition about the role of rights 
in practical reasoning. First, the clause “other things being equal” is often 
overlooked when using the definition, but in many circumstances other things 
are not equal. Briefly, rights are seen as defeasible reasons, not all-things-
considered or overriding reasons, in practical reasoning. And second, rights 
are taken as intermediate conclusions between statements about the interests 
of the right-holder and statements about another’s duty. In other words, the 
fact that a right exists is used, along with other premises, to draw conclusions 
concerning the duties of other people towards the right-holder (Raz 1984, 5). 
That allows us to contemplate rights in a dynamic way, as grounding different 
duties according to changing circumstances.
With this definition in mind, the analysis of language rights needs deal 
with four different aspects of any right: 1) who is or can be the holder; 2) 
what is the right’s content, or what is a right to; 3) who is the addressee of the 
claim-right, or who bears the correlative duty; 4) and last but nor least, what 
is the right’s degree of stringency, that is, its weighing force as compared to 
competing considerations.
Of course, that last point depends on how we can justify the right. Accord-
ing to Raz’s definition, we have to point out what is the interest or the good 
of the holder protected or promoted by the right in question. However, it is 
important in the present discussion on language rights because of the popular 
mythology about human rights, which takes them as extremely stringent or 
quasi-absolute rights. A related misunderstanding is the idea that all human 
rights have to be considered on equal footing or are equally stringent.
But no less crucial is the issue about the holder of language rights, when 
considering if language rights can be seen as human rights. Obviously, the 
contentious point turns on collective rights. By far, much of the discussion 
seems to turn on the first clause of the Razian definition: what kind of enti-
ties can have rights? Language rights are supposed to be a clear case of group 
rights or minority rights, and so taken as collective rights.3 That will be my 
concern here, because this is one key reason why many people are stubbornly 
opposed to recognizing language rights as part of human rights.
The identification of language rights with minority rights is apparent in 
May’s work, for example. His argument in favour of language rights relies 
on Kymlicka’s well-known justification of group-differentiated rights for cul-
tural minorities (Kymlicka 1989, 1995), and language rights are understood as 
3 More precisely, proponents of language rights take them as individual as well as col-
lective rights (Skutnabb-Kangas & Philipson 1995, 2). For May himself the label of “group-
differentiated rights” covers different possibilities regarding the holder of these rights: “they can 
in fact be accorded to individual members of a group, or to the group as a whole, or to a federal 
state/province within which the group forms a majority” (May 2011, 268).
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minority rights, based on the moral significance of culture. This interpretation 
of language rights reduces the range of interests that could serve to justify 
language rights and reflects the culturalist bias of much of contemporary po-
litical philosophy (Toscano 2007). But the point to which we should pay at-
tention here is the fact that taking them as collective rights can be misleading. 
Indeed, as May himself has remarked, one key weakness of the human rights 
approach to language rights has been the tendency to assume the notion of 
collective rights as unproblematic (May 2003, 106). For that reason, the col-
lective aspect of language rights has to be carefully explained.
two conceptions of coLLective rights
For discussion on language rights, it should be noticed a crucial ambi-
guity concerning the notion of collective right. It matters to bear in mind a 
significant distinction made by important contemporary authors dealing with 
the issue. So, we can talk about two views on collective rights (Green 1991), 
depending on whether we mean by it either the holder of the right or the kind 
of good to which the holder is entitled to, and that means not mixing the first 
and second points in the analysis of rights aforementioned. Peter Jones has 
coined a useful terminology to express the difference between these two con-
ceptions of collective rights, which he calls the “corporate conception” and 
the “collective conception” of collective rights (Jones 1999).
For the corporate conception, not only individual persons are right-holders 
because different kinds of social entities can have rights. So, collective rights 
are defined by who is the holder of the right, for example a social group. 
Naturally, talking about the right of a social group can be a way to refer to a 
right belonging to each individual within the group. Nevertheless, according 
to the corporate conception, collective rights are assigned to the group as such 
and not distributively to its individual members. For doing that, the social 
group has to be conceived as a single, integral entity, something like a sort of 
collective agent, capable of having rights and obligations of their own, dif-
ferent from the rights and obligations of individuals who make up the group.
To sum up, in the corporate view collective rights are regarded as the 
rights of collective agents. So, the crucial point for the discussion about them 
revolves around the first condition of the definition proposed by Raz (the 
capacity condition): whether collective entities, like linguistic communities 
for example, can have rights. It is the same kind of question often posed about 
whether foetuses, non-human animals or future generations can have rights.
It is often mentioned that collective entities can have legal rights. Corpo-
rations are the best example, hence the name for this conception. Under the 
law corporations are treated as artificial or fictitious persons (persona ficta) 
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and vested with legal personality of their own, namely with legal rights and 
duties. Two comments are pertinent here. First, from the point of view of the 
law a corporation is not a collection of individuals, but a “fictitious individual 
person separate from all the persons making up the sociological group” (Hart-
ney 1993, 214). Of course, in a sociological sense corporations are roughly 
seen as a group of persons organized in a certain way around a division of 
labour, hierarchical roles, and procedural rules for taking decisions. But the 
legal point of view is different, dealing with the corporation as a single (artifi-
cial) person or right-holder. In that sense, corporate rights are not group rights 
or collective rights strictly.
In this regard, Michael Hartney has denounced a common fallacy that 
occurs when the sociological and legal views are muddled up considering 
collective rights, as in the following argumentative sketch: 1) Corporations 
and states have legal rights; 2) corporations and states are collectives enti-
ties or social groups; 3) therefore, (some) collective entities or social groups 
have legal rights. Plainly, if the truth of conclusion depends on the truth of 
premises, it is to be noticed that the first premise is true in legal but not in 
sociological sense, while the second premise is true from a sociological but 
not from a legal point of view (Hartney 1993, 215).
And second, we are talking about legal rights of corporations, and for that 
we just have to look at the law. But our issue here are fundamental rights, that 
is, moral rights and not just legal rights. It is obvious that corporations have 
legal rights, but it is not at all obvious that corporations are endowed with 
fundamental rights; for that they should been regarded as having moral rights. 
However, assuming that only the life and well-being of individual human be-
ings have ultimate value or moral importance, corporations cannot have moral 
rights. Moral individualism is a key aspect of human rights discourse. When 
speaking of human rights we usually think about fundamental rights for in-
dividual human beings, but corporations and other artificial legal persons are 
not human beings. Therefore, they cannot have human rights.
However, there is another sense in which we can understand collective 
rights, the “collective conception” in Jones’ terms. Accordingly, collective 
rights have to be considered not as the rights pertaining to collectives agents, 
but as rights to a shared or collective good. In that conception, the holders 
of the collective right are individual human beings inasmuch as they share a 
common interest in a collective good. What is at issue here is the kind of good 
to which they are entitled, not who is or can be the right-holder.
Raz offers the most influential account of what a collective right is in this 
second view, according to which a collective right exists when the following 
three conditions are met:
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First, it exists because an aspect of the interest of human beings 
justifies holding some person(s) to be subject to a duty; second, the 
interest in question are the interest of individuals as members of a 
group in a public good and the right is a right to that public good 
because it serves their interest as members of the group; thirdly, the 
interest of no single member of that group in that public good is 
sufficient by itself to justify holding another person to be subject to 
a duty (Raz 1986, 208).
This second conception of collective rights seems much more suitable to 
understand the language rights than the corporate conception. Linguistic com-
munities typically lack the legal personality of corporations and, more impor-
tant, they should not be considered as artificial persons with rights of their 
own. However, according to the “collective conception”, a language right is 
a right to a public good, but only individuals are entitled to that public good. 
The right is based on the interest of individuals in the public good, but unlike 
other rights the interest of each individual separately is not sufficient to justify 
the duty to supply the public good.
Indeed, languages meet the properties typically used for defining public 
goods: impossibility of exclusion, joint supply, and non-rivalry in consump-
tion. Some brief observations are sufficient to explain why languages can be 
regarded as a public good par excellence. First, natural languages are acces-
sible to anyone who wants to learn and use them. Second, the production and 
maintenance of any language requires the collaboration of many speakers 
but not all, since no speaker is necessary or sufficient for that. Third, lan-
guages exhibit non-rivalry in consumption to the extent that a speaker using 
the language does not detract at all from the use by others. On the contrary, 
languages display positive network externalities, as economists say: the more 
people use a language, the more useful it is for speakers, offering more com-
munication opportunities and more linguistic goods and services available.
There are several advantages in this view of collective rights for discuss-
ing language rights. It fits in with the widespread intuition that numbers mat-
ter regarding languages. Furthermore, as they are claims to a public good, 
language rights can only generate imperfect duties, being highly sensitive to 
sociolinguistic circumstances. And, above all, it represents a sober, almost 
minimal, view of what a linguistic community is: a group of individuals shar-
ing a common interest in a public good, without assuming anything more than 
this shared interest in using their language.
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concLuding remArKs
As we have seen, the concept of language rights is not straightforward and 
requires extensive analysis and discussion if we want to better understand its 
content, scope and rationale. This article picks out one of these aspects: the 
collective nature attributed to language rights. For there is a good reason to 
address this issue in the context of the discussion about whether language 
rights are human rights. Plainly, the fact of being considered as collective 
rights seems to be a major objection to accept them as part of human rights. 
As May explains:
A key reason for this lack of wider discussion of promotion-oriented 
language rights for minority groups, and the related skepticism 
towards their recognition and implementation, lies in the normative 
understanding, post-Second World War, of human rights as 
primarily, even exclusively, individual rights (May 2011, 267).
But the terms of this opposition and scepticism need to be clarified taking 
into account that there is a crucial ambiguity in the notion of collective rights, 
as we have noted. If languages rights are seen as collective in the corporate 
sense, the scepticism to which May refers is well justified. Actual language 
communities do not fit the corporate agent model. Besides, if we talk about 
fundamental rights, we are looking for moral rights, not only legal rights. 
And, most importantly, the supposed moral rights of corporations, if they 
could have them, would be separate rights from and above the rights of indi-
vidual speakers, leaving room for conflicts between corporate and individual 
rights or for imposing duties on individual speakers towards the language 
community taken as an artificial person.
Instead, much of the opposition loses ground if we take language rights 
as rights of individual speakers regarding the use of language as a collective 
good. As we have seen, this second view of collective rights presents some 
advantages in the discussion on language rights. One analytical advantage 
is to shift the focus of attention from the question about the rights’ holder, 
and the longwinded discussions about what kind of entities can have rights, 
to look instead for the content of these rights, what interests they protect or 
promote, and the kind of duties generated by them. From a normative stand-
point, it is a view in line with moral individualism, according to which only 
individual persons morally matter, while groups and corporations have moral 
relevance only insofar as they affect the good life and interests of individuals. 
At least at this point, one of the main reasons for scepticism about whether 
language rights are human rights can be discarded.
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